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band. It could not be returned to the aggrieved party despite the
illegal seizure. On this basis, the court made a distinction as to
McDonald where the decision as to the defendant's conviction turned
upon the fact that there was error in not returning the evidence to the
aggrieved party. The court considered its decision to be in com-
plete agreement with the McDonald decision.18
To adopt the proposition that evidence seized in violation of A's
rights is admissible against B where contraband is involved would be
to create an inconsistency in the law and a clear discrimination
favoring certain defendants over others. Where the unlawfully seized
evidence consisted of property other than contraband, such as lottery
tickets as in McDonald, B would be protected as an incidental bene-
ficiary to A's rights under the fourth amendment. B would not be so
protected where, as in Lee Wan Nam, the seized property consisted
of narcotics or other such contraband.
The analysis of these alternative propositions leads to the conclu-
sion that to broaden the exclusionary rule, as defendants sought in
Granello, and to include as incidental beneficiaries of the deterrence
policy persons whose rights were unaffected by the official legality
would be to render the rule a far more inefficient sanction. As the
court points out, whether or not the rule is to be so broadened is a
matter ultimately for the Supreme Court, and in light of present
policies and authorities it is difficult to anticipate it doing so.
David W. Crumbo
CRUMINAL LAw-SARcH Am SEZtURE-RETROACTIVnT OF Mapp.-Peti-
tioner was convicted of robbery by a Louisiana court on May 20, 1959.
At his trial he contested the use of certain evidence on the ground
that it had been illegally seized, but the trial court held the seizure
valid. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. In June 1961, immedi-
ately after the Mapp decision1 making the federal exclusionary rule
mandatory upon state courts, petitioner filed an application for habeas
corpus in the state court. The writ was denied and on appeal the denial
was affirmed. Petitioner then filed habeas corpus proceedings in the
federal district court; again the writ was denied and petitioner ap-
pealed to the circuit court of appeals. There, the court ruled the
search and seizure invalid, but refused to apply the Mapp rule to
petitioner's case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: Al-
18 Id. at 866.
1Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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firmed. The Mapp rule does not apply retrospectively to cases finally
decided before its enunciation.2
The real controversy in the case is not whether the Mapp rule
applies retrospectively; it clearly does for Mrs. Mapp's conviction was
reversed, but rather where to draw the retrospective line. The Court
drew the line at June 19, 1961, the date of the Mapp decision. To any
case finally decided before this time the Mapp rule does not apply.3
This writer suggests that the Court has made a wise decision.
There is a legal theory that judges discover law rather than create
it,4 and following that theory one can easily reach the conclusion that
a court must apply any judicial rule retroactively. The application of
that theory to this case would be something as follows. Nothing in
the Constitution which the Court thought controlling in Mapp has
been changed since before Wolf; thus if the protections were there
for Mapp they must have been there for all persons convicted before
Mapp.6 This legal theory reached its pinnacle in Norton v. Shelby Co.7
where the Court, when invalidating municipal bonds because the act
issuing them had been held unconstitutional by the supreme court of
the state, said "an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights;
it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,
in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed."8 This theory was rejected in subsequent cases. In Chicot
County Dist. v. Baxter State Bank9 the Court said of the Norton case:
"It is quite clear however that such broad statements as to the effect
of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifica-
tions.... The past cannot always be erased by a judicial decision."",
Relying mainly on language in Chicot," the majority in Linkletter
reached the conclusion that "the Constitution neither requires nor
prohibits retrospective effect."12 Then, looking at the purpose of the
Mapp rule, the effect on the administration of justice retrospectivity
-Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
3 "By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had
elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio." Linkletter v. Walker, supra note
2 n.5.
4 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 69 (1769).
5 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
13 Hall v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 313 F.2d. 483, 495 (1963).
7 118 U.S. 425 (1886).
sid. at 442.
9 308 U.S. 871 (1940).
1o Id. at 374.
11 [Tlhe effect of the subsequent ruling of invalidity on prior judgments
when collaterally attacked is subject to no set principle of absolute retroactive
' 381 U.S. at 629.
invalidity .. " Chicot County Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, supra note 9, at 374.
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would have, and the reliance placed on the Wolf doctrine, the Court
determined the June 19 cutoff date as opposed to general retrospec-
tivity. This writer submits that the Court need have looked no further
than the purpose of the rule. The purpose of the Mapp rule was to
deter police from making illegal searches and seizures;13 that purpose
will not be served by the wholesale release of prisoners convicted prior
to Mapp. The only police conduct which can be deterred is future
conduct. If the rule was never intended to directly relieve those who
have suffered a violation of their constitutional rights then there is no
reason for making the rule retrospective.14
Granted this is the first of the constitutional rules in the criminal
law area which has not been given general retrospectivity,' 5 but in the
previous cases the rules dealt with something which struck at the
heart of a fair trial. It is suggested that one is more apt to have a fair
trial, i.e., the truth is more likely to be reached where illegally seized
evidence is used rather than where one is without counsel, or has
confessed through coercion, or has been denied a trial transcript for
an appeal. With illegally seized evidence there perhaps is no question
as to the guilt of the accused, and this is what distinguishes it from
Eskridge, Gideon, and that line of cases.16 The only reason any col-
lateral attack should be allowed is to eliminate the risk of innocent
convictions.1'7 In the illegal search and seizure cases, there is no threat
What does Linkletter foreshadow for Escobedo'8 and related cases?
On the basis of Linkletter, it would seem that the Court would deny
general retrospectivity of Escobedo. Like the guilt of Mrs. Mapp and
Linkletter there was little doubt as to the veracity of Escobedo's con-
fession. The right to counsel rule "did not emanate from the inherent
unreliability of the confessions introduced in the trials.... The Court
13 "[O]nly last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is 'to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in
the only effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it... :"
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, at 656 (1961).
14 Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision:
Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 650 (1962).
15Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (coerced confession rule applied
retrospectively); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (a collateral attack
itself requiring counsel to be appointed in felony cases); Eskridge v. Washington,
357 U.S. 214 (1958) (applying right of indigent to have free transcript of trial
in order to appeal).
16 Eskridge v. Washington; Gideon v. Wainwright; Jackson v. Denno, supra
note 15.
17 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke L.J. 317,
at 340.
of this.
18 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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sought to discourage oppressive police practices... .19 But there have
been other interpretations of Escobedo and for the final answer we
will have to await the Court's decision.
Charles A. Taylor
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRIAL ON Two OFFENSES ARISING FROM THE
SAm Acr-No DOUBLE JEOPABIY INvoLvD.-Appellant was indicted
by the grand jury on charges of embezzlement. Prior to his trial for
embezzlement, the grand jury returned thirty-two indictments against
appellant for submitting false claims to the Pike County Board of
Education, a political subdivision of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
Both the false claim and the embezzlement indictment covered the
same moneys. The commonwealth attorney, feeling that appellant
should be tried on a false claim indictment, filed a motion to dismiss
the embezzlement charge. This motion was overruled, and trial
proceeded on the embezzlement charge. The prosecution refused to
introduce evidence, and the jury acquitted appellant. Shortly there-
after, appellant was tried on one of the false claim indictments and
convicted.
On appeal, appellant contended, inter alia, that he had been put
in double jeopardy by his conviction for submitting a false claim,
maintaining his acquittal under the embezzlement indictment was a
bar to the false claim action.
Held: Affirmed. The court found that embezzlement and falsifying
a claim against a political subdivision are truly separate offenses, and
also found that double jeopardy meant "a person may not be tried or
prosecuted the second time for the same offense."1 Runyon v. Com-
monwealth, 393 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1965).
The doctrine of double jeopardy is so ancient that it is impossible
to trace its origin,2 and its concept is firmly embedded in the common
law and has been incorporated in most constitutions.3 The Kentucky
Constitution, echoing the prohibition of the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution, states in section 13, "No person shall, for
the same offense be twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb.... ."
In order for the double jeopardy prohibition to be invoked suc-
cessfully, the accused must be tried tvice for the same offense. It must
19In re Lopez, 42 Cal. 188, 398 P.2d. 380 (1965).
1 Moss v. Jones, 352 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Ky. 1961).
2 Mullins v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 529, 80 S.W.2d 606 (1935).
3 Burch v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 519, 42 S.W.2d 714 (1931).
